Publications
Journal Articles
‘Deflationism and Truthmaking’, forthcoming in Synthese. Published (Open access). Draft.
This paper is about the relationship between truthmaking – one of the pillars of contemporary metaphysics – and deflationism about truth – one of the main contenders in the debate about truth, and a key component of the broad anti-metaphysical philosophical approach known as (contemporary) pragmatism. Many philosophers have argued that deflationism and truthmaking are incompatible or in conflict in some interesting way. Some take this to count against deflationism, others to count against truthmaking. In this paper I argue that deflationism and truthmaking are compatible in most of the ways in which they are commonly thought to be incompatible. Deflationism does not render truthmaking unintelligible, avoidable, unmotivated, or trivial. While deflationism is incompatible with certain ideas within mainstream truthmaking, I argue that these ideas result from merely optional assumptions and principles commonly accepted by mainstream truthmaker theorists.
2020, ‘Creeping Minimalism and Subject Matter’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50, 750-766 Published. Draft.
The problem of creeping minimalism concerns how to tell the difference between metaethical expressivismand its rivals given contemporary expressivists’acceptance of minimalism about truth and related concepts.Explanationism finds the difference in what expressivists use to explain why ethical language and thoughthas the content it does. I argue that two recent versions of explanationism (including one I defended in an earlier paper) are unsatisfactory and offer a thirdversion, subject matter explanationism. This view, I argue, captures the advantages of previous views withouttheir disadvantages and gives us a principled and general characterisation of non-representational viewsabout all kinds of language and thought.
2020 ‘What is Global Expressivism?’ Philosophical Quarterly 70(278), 140-161. Published. Draft
This paper was included in Oxford University Press's 2020 'Best of Philosophy' list.
Global expressivism is the radical view that we should never think of any of our language and thought as representing the world. While interesting, global expressivism has not yet been clearly formulated, and its defenders often use unexplained terms of art to characterise their view. I fix this problem by carefully and clearly exploring the different ways in which we can interpret globalism. I reject almost all of them either because they are implausible or because they are bad interpretations of actual globalist views. I then argue that the most promising version of globalism, which we can find in the work of Huw Price, turns out to be completely compatible with the view of so-called ‘local’ expressivists. The debate between globalists and localists is therefore empty: the real interest in this topic lies not in this debate but in whether globalism is true and if so what follows from it.
2018 ‘Solving the Problem of Creeping Minimalism’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48, 510-531. Published. Draft.
In this paper I discuss the so-called problem of creeping minimalism, the problem of distinguishing metaethical expressivism from its rivals once expressivists start accepting minimalist theories about truth, representation, belief, and similar concepts. I argue that Dreier’s ‘explanation’ explanation is almost correct, but by critically examining it we not only get a better solution, but also draw out some interesting results about expressivism and non-representationalist theories of meaning more generally.
2016 ‘MacBride on Truth in Truthmaking’, Analysis 76, 19-26. Published. Draft.
Fraser MacBride (2013) argues that if deflationism about truth is right, then the truthmaker principle that every truth has a truthmaker is implausible, so anyone interested in accepting the truthmaker principle had better reject deflationism. In this article, I argue that MacBride’s argument fails: even if deflationism is true, the truthmaker principle is not, as MacBride thinks, equivalent to an implausible claim. Instead, the deflationist can give a different reading of the truthmaker principle on which it is independently motivated.
2014 ‘Defending Truthmaker Non-Maximalism’, Thought 3(4), 288-291. Open access link here. Draft
Mark Jago (2012) argues that truthmaker non-maximalism, the view that some but not all truths require truthmakers, is vulnerable to a challenge from truths which ascribe knowledge of propositions about things which don’t exist. Such truths, Jago argues, can only be dealt with using maximalist resources. I argue that Jago’s point relies on the claim that the relevant truths require truthmakers, a point that non-maximalists can coherently and plausibly deny. Moreover, I argue that by making use of a safety account of knowledge, non-maximalists can fully answer Jago’s challenge.
Other Writing
2021 Review of Frank Ramsey: A Sheer Excess of Powers by Cheryl Misak, Journal of the History of Analytic Philosophy 9(2), 28-32. (Open access)
2020 'Distinguishing Descriptions', for Huw Price's Flickering Shadows series at 3:16am.
2019 ‘Malevolence, Insouciance' - review of Vices of the Mind by Quassim Cassam, Times Literary Supplement No.6059, 17 May 2019. Link here (paywall) Draft.
‘Deflationism and Truthmaking’, forthcoming in Synthese. Published (Open access). Draft.
This paper is about the relationship between truthmaking – one of the pillars of contemporary metaphysics – and deflationism about truth – one of the main contenders in the debate about truth, and a key component of the broad anti-metaphysical philosophical approach known as (contemporary) pragmatism. Many philosophers have argued that deflationism and truthmaking are incompatible or in conflict in some interesting way. Some take this to count against deflationism, others to count against truthmaking. In this paper I argue that deflationism and truthmaking are compatible in most of the ways in which they are commonly thought to be incompatible. Deflationism does not render truthmaking unintelligible, avoidable, unmotivated, or trivial. While deflationism is incompatible with certain ideas within mainstream truthmaking, I argue that these ideas result from merely optional assumptions and principles commonly accepted by mainstream truthmaker theorists.
2020, ‘Creeping Minimalism and Subject Matter’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50, 750-766 Published. Draft.
The problem of creeping minimalism concerns how to tell the difference between metaethical expressivismand its rivals given contemporary expressivists’acceptance of minimalism about truth and related concepts.Explanationism finds the difference in what expressivists use to explain why ethical language and thoughthas the content it does. I argue that two recent versions of explanationism (including one I defended in an earlier paper) are unsatisfactory and offer a thirdversion, subject matter explanationism. This view, I argue, captures the advantages of previous views withouttheir disadvantages and gives us a principled and general characterisation of non-representational viewsabout all kinds of language and thought.
2020 ‘What is Global Expressivism?’ Philosophical Quarterly 70(278), 140-161. Published. Draft
This paper was included in Oxford University Press's 2020 'Best of Philosophy' list.
Global expressivism is the radical view that we should never think of any of our language and thought as representing the world. While interesting, global expressivism has not yet been clearly formulated, and its defenders often use unexplained terms of art to characterise their view. I fix this problem by carefully and clearly exploring the different ways in which we can interpret globalism. I reject almost all of them either because they are implausible or because they are bad interpretations of actual globalist views. I then argue that the most promising version of globalism, which we can find in the work of Huw Price, turns out to be completely compatible with the view of so-called ‘local’ expressivists. The debate between globalists and localists is therefore empty: the real interest in this topic lies not in this debate but in whether globalism is true and if so what follows from it.
2018 ‘Solving the Problem of Creeping Minimalism’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48, 510-531. Published. Draft.
In this paper I discuss the so-called problem of creeping minimalism, the problem of distinguishing metaethical expressivism from its rivals once expressivists start accepting minimalist theories about truth, representation, belief, and similar concepts. I argue that Dreier’s ‘explanation’ explanation is almost correct, but by critically examining it we not only get a better solution, but also draw out some interesting results about expressivism and non-representationalist theories of meaning more generally.
2016 ‘MacBride on Truth in Truthmaking’, Analysis 76, 19-26. Published. Draft.
Fraser MacBride (2013) argues that if deflationism about truth is right, then the truthmaker principle that every truth has a truthmaker is implausible, so anyone interested in accepting the truthmaker principle had better reject deflationism. In this article, I argue that MacBride’s argument fails: even if deflationism is true, the truthmaker principle is not, as MacBride thinks, equivalent to an implausible claim. Instead, the deflationist can give a different reading of the truthmaker principle on which it is independently motivated.
2014 ‘Defending Truthmaker Non-Maximalism’, Thought 3(4), 288-291. Open access link here. Draft
Mark Jago (2012) argues that truthmaker non-maximalism, the view that some but not all truths require truthmakers, is vulnerable to a challenge from truths which ascribe knowledge of propositions about things which don’t exist. Such truths, Jago argues, can only be dealt with using maximalist resources. I argue that Jago’s point relies on the claim that the relevant truths require truthmakers, a point that non-maximalists can coherently and plausibly deny. Moreover, I argue that by making use of a safety account of knowledge, non-maximalists can fully answer Jago’s challenge.
Other Writing
2021 Review of Frank Ramsey: A Sheer Excess of Powers by Cheryl Misak, Journal of the History of Analytic Philosophy 9(2), 28-32. (Open access)
2020 'Distinguishing Descriptions', for Huw Price's Flickering Shadows series at 3:16am.
2019 ‘Malevolence, Insouciance' - review of Vices of the Mind by Quassim Cassam, Times Literary Supplement No.6059, 17 May 2019. Link here (paywall) Draft.