Publications
Please click the article title for an abstract and links to published and draft versions.
Journal Articles
Journal Articles
2026 'The Adoption Problem and the Nature of General Belief', with Corine Besson. Topoi.
Co-authored with Corine Besson.
Published (open access).
The Adoption Problem suggests that it is impossible to rationally choose or adopt new basic logical principles. It aims to refute cognitivist views according to which adopting a logical principle is accepting or coming to believe a general principle, and then applying it in reasoning – according to which it is coming to have a belief whose content is a general proposition, which is then applied in reasoning. In this paper, we explore a new solution to the Adoption Problem inspired by Ramsey’s view of general beliefs as ‘habit[s] of singular belief’ (Ramsey 1929: 148). According to him, beliefs with a general content are special in that they are dispositional states. We show how this feature paves the way for a solution to the Adoption Problem which combines cognitivism with a form of expressivism.
Published (open access).
The Adoption Problem suggests that it is impossible to rationally choose or adopt new basic logical principles. It aims to refute cognitivist views according to which adopting a logical principle is accepting or coming to believe a general principle, and then applying it in reasoning – according to which it is coming to have a belief whose content is a general proposition, which is then applied in reasoning. In this paper, we explore a new solution to the Adoption Problem inspired by Ramsey’s view of general beliefs as ‘habit[s] of singular belief’ (Ramsey 1929: 148). According to him, beliefs with a general content are special in that they are dispositional states. We show how this feature paves the way for a solution to the Adoption Problem which combines cognitivism with a form of expressivism.
Against the Standard Semantics for 'All' and 'Every', forthcoming in Analysis
Published (open access). Draft.
This paper presents a new problem for the standard semantics for ‘all’ and ‘every’ on which ‘every F is G’ and ‘all Fs are Gs’ are true just in case the set of things that satisfy ‘F’ is a subset of the set of things that satisfy ‘G’. I argue that the standard semantics makes highly counterintuitive predictions about what credences it is rational to adopt in a generalisation ‘every F is G’ when we are confident but not certain that nothing is F. I show how, unlike the better known counterintuitive result that if nothing is F, ‘every F is G’ is true, this problem cannot be avoided by appealing to pragmatic principles, nor by rejecting some orthodox principles about the relationship between credences and propositions.
This paper presents a new problem for the standard semantics for ‘all’ and ‘every’ on which ‘every F is G’ and ‘all Fs are Gs’ are true just in case the set of things that satisfy ‘F’ is a subset of the set of things that satisfy ‘G’. I argue that the standard semantics makes highly counterintuitive predictions about what credences it is rational to adopt in a generalisation ‘every F is G’ when we are confident but not certain that nothing is F. I show how, unlike the better known counterintuitive result that if nothing is F, ‘every F is G’ is true, this problem cannot be avoided by appealing to pragmatic principles, nor by rejecting some orthodox principles about the relationship between credences and propositions.
2024 'Representation, Meaning, and C-Synonymy', Teorema. International Journal of Philosophy, 43(3), 97–108
Published.
This paper gives a brief critical discussion of some elements of the pragmatist view of language defended by José Zalabardo in his book Pragmatist Semantics [Zalabardo (2023)]. I argue that Zalabardo’s pragmatist theory is not clearly stronger than the other pragmatist theories already defended in the literature; partly this is because those other theories may be able to explain the same phenomena as Zalabardo’s view, and partly it is because Zalabardo’s view does not obviously explain those phenomena as well as we might hope.
This paper gives a brief critical discussion of some elements of the pragmatist view of language defended by José Zalabardo in his book Pragmatist Semantics [Zalabardo (2023)]. I argue that Zalabardo’s pragmatist theory is not clearly stronger than the other pragmatist theories already defended in the literature; partly this is because those other theories may be able to explain the same phenomena as Zalabardo’s view, and partly it is because Zalabardo’s view does not obviously explain those phenomena as well as we might hope.
2023, 'Should expressivists go global?', Philosophical Studies 180, 2275–2289
Published (Open access). Draft.
Moral expressivists think that moral thoughts and sentences don’t represent or describe the world, at least not in any interesting sense. Global expressivists think that no thoughts or sentences represent the world; local expressivists think that some do and others don’t. Huw Price has influentially argued that local expressivism collapses into global expressivism, due both to the effects of minimalist theories of representation and similar concepts, and also to an unappreciated consequence of the success of specific expressivist theories like moral expressivism. In this paper I argue that Price’s arguments don’t succeed. While they can be fixed, doing so makes them miss their intended target. Local expressivists should therefore not be worried by Price’s arguments.
Moral expressivists think that moral thoughts and sentences don’t represent or describe the world, at least not in any interesting sense. Global expressivists think that no thoughts or sentences represent the world; local expressivists think that some do and others don’t. Huw Price has influentially argued that local expressivism collapses into global expressivism, due both to the effects of minimalist theories of representation and similar concepts, and also to an unappreciated consequence of the success of specific expressivist theories like moral expressivism. In this paper I argue that Price’s arguments don’t succeed. While they can be fixed, doing so makes them miss their intended target. Local expressivists should therefore not be worried by Price’s arguments.
2021, ‘Deflationism and Truthmaking’, Synthese 198, 3157-3181
Published (Open access). Draft.
This paper is about the relationship between truthmaking – one of the pillars of contemporary metaphysics – and deflationism about truth – one of the main contenders in the debate about truth, and a key component of the broad anti-metaphysical philosophical approach known as (contemporary) pragmatism. Many philosophers have argued that deflationism and truthmaking are incompatible or in conflict in some interesting way. Some take this to count against deflationism, others to count against truthmaking. In this paper I argue that deflationism and truthmaking are compatible in most of the ways in which they are commonly thought to be incompatible. Deflationism does not render truthmaking unintelligible, avoidable, unmotivated, or trivial. While deflationism is incompatible with certain ideas within mainstream truthmaking, I argue that these ideas result from merely optional assumptions and principles commonly accepted by mainstream truthmaker theorists.
This paper is about the relationship between truthmaking – one of the pillars of contemporary metaphysics – and deflationism about truth – one of the main contenders in the debate about truth, and a key component of the broad anti-metaphysical philosophical approach known as (contemporary) pragmatism. Many philosophers have argued that deflationism and truthmaking are incompatible or in conflict in some interesting way. Some take this to count against deflationism, others to count against truthmaking. In this paper I argue that deflationism and truthmaking are compatible in most of the ways in which they are commonly thought to be incompatible. Deflationism does not render truthmaking unintelligible, avoidable, unmotivated, or trivial. While deflationism is incompatible with certain ideas within mainstream truthmaking, I argue that these ideas result from merely optional assumptions and principles commonly accepted by mainstream truthmaker theorists.
2020, ‘Creeping Minimalism and Subject Matter’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50, 750-766
Published. Draft.
The problem of creeping minimalism concerns how to tell the difference between metaethical expressivismand its rivals given contemporary expressivists’ acceptance of minimalism about truth and related concepts. Explanationism finds the difference in what expressivists use to explain why ethical language and thought has the content it does. I argue that two recent versions of explanationism (including one I defended in an earlier paper) are unsatisfactory and offer a third version, subject matter explanationism. This view, I argue, captures the advantages of previous views without their disadvantages and gives us a principled and general characterisation of non-representational views about all kinds of language and thought.
The problem of creeping minimalism concerns how to tell the difference between metaethical expressivismand its rivals given contemporary expressivists’ acceptance of minimalism about truth and related concepts. Explanationism finds the difference in what expressivists use to explain why ethical language and thought has the content it does. I argue that two recent versions of explanationism (including one I defended in an earlier paper) are unsatisfactory and offer a third version, subject matter explanationism. This view, I argue, captures the advantages of previous views without their disadvantages and gives us a principled and general characterisation of non-representational views about all kinds of language and thought.
2020 ‘What is Global Expressivism?’ Philosophical Quarterly 70(278), 140-161.
This paper was included in Oxford University Press's 2020 'Best of Philosophy' list.
Published. Draft.
Global expressivism is the radical view that we should never think of any of our language and thought as representing the world. While interesting, global expressivism has not yet been clearly formulated, and its defenders often use unexplained terms of art to characterise their view. I fix this problem by carefully and clearly exploring the different ways in which we can interpret globalism. I reject almost all of them either because they are implausible or because they are bad interpretations of actual globalist views. I then argue that the most promising version of globalism, which we can find in the work of Huw Price, turns out to be completely compatible with the view of so-called ‘local’ expressivists. The debate between globalists and localists is therefore empty: the real interest in this topic lies not in this debate but in whether globalism is true and if so what follows from it.
Published. Draft.
Global expressivism is the radical view that we should never think of any of our language and thought as representing the world. While interesting, global expressivism has not yet been clearly formulated, and its defenders often use unexplained terms of art to characterise their view. I fix this problem by carefully and clearly exploring the different ways in which we can interpret globalism. I reject almost all of them either because they are implausible or because they are bad interpretations of actual globalist views. I then argue that the most promising version of globalism, which we can find in the work of Huw Price, turns out to be completely compatible with the view of so-called ‘local’ expressivists. The debate between globalists and localists is therefore empty: the real interest in this topic lies not in this debate but in whether globalism is true and if so what follows from it.
2018 ‘Solving the Problem of Creeping Minimalism’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48, 510-531.
Published. Draft.
In this paper I discuss the so-called problem of creeping minimalism, the problem of distinguishing metaethical expressivism from its rivals once expressivists start accepting minimalist theories about truth, representation, belief, and similar concepts. I argue that Dreier’s ‘explanation’ explanation is almost correct, but by critically examining it we not only get a better solution, but also draw out some interesting results about expressivism and non-representationalist theories of meaning more generally.
In this paper I discuss the so-called problem of creeping minimalism, the problem of distinguishing metaethical expressivism from its rivals once expressivists start accepting minimalist theories about truth, representation, belief, and similar concepts. I argue that Dreier’s ‘explanation’ explanation is almost correct, but by critically examining it we not only get a better solution, but also draw out some interesting results about expressivism and non-representationalist theories of meaning more generally.
2016 ‘MacBride on Truth in Truthmaking’, Analysis 76, 19-26.
Published. Draft.
Fraser MacBride (2013) argues that if deflationism about truth is right, then the truthmaker principle that every truth has a truthmaker is implausible, so anyone interested in accepting the truthmaker principle had better reject deflationism. In this article, I argue that MacBride’s argument fails: even if deflationism is true, the truthmaker principle is not, as MacBride thinks, equivalent to an implausible claim. Instead, the deflationist can give a different reading of the truthmaker principle on which it is independently motivated.
Fraser MacBride (2013) argues that if deflationism about truth is right, then the truthmaker principle that every truth has a truthmaker is implausible, so anyone interested in accepting the truthmaker principle had better reject deflationism. In this article, I argue that MacBride’s argument fails: even if deflationism is true, the truthmaker principle is not, as MacBride thinks, equivalent to an implausible claim. Instead, the deflationist can give a different reading of the truthmaker principle on which it is independently motivated.
2014 ‘Defending Truthmaker Non-Maximalism’, Thought 3(4), 288-291.
Published (open access). Draft
Mark Jago (2012) argues that truthmaker non-maximalism, the view that some but not all truths require truthmakers, is vulnerable to a challenge from truths which ascribe knowledge of propositions about things which don’t exist. Such truths, Jago argues, can only be dealt with using maximalist resources. I argue that Jago’s point relies on the claim that the relevant truths require truthmakers, a point that non-maximalists can coherently and plausibly deny. Moreover, I argue that by making use of a safety account of knowledge, non-maximalists can fully answer Jago’s challenge.
Mark Jago (2012) argues that truthmaker non-maximalism, the view that some but not all truths require truthmakers, is vulnerable to a challenge from truths which ascribe knowledge of propositions about things which don’t exist. Such truths, Jago argues, can only be dealt with using maximalist resources. I argue that Jago’s point relies on the claim that the relevant truths require truthmakers, a point that non-maximalists can coherently and plausibly deny. Moreover, I argue that by making use of a safety account of knowledge, non-maximalists can fully answer Jago’s challenge.
Other Writing
2021 Review of Frank Ramsey: A Sheer Excess of Powers by Cheryl Misak, Journal of the History of Analytic Philosophy 9(2), 28-32.
2020 'Distinguishing Descriptions', for Huw Price's Flickering Shadows series at 3:16am.
Page last updated 04/09/2026
